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Abstract
This study estimates time varying fiscal multipliers from the aspect of fiscal policy
rules derived from the systematic component along the line of “Agnostic Identifica-
tion Procedure” proposed by Caldara and Kamps (2017) for the US economy between
1952:Q1-2018:Q1. To do so, we adopt time-varying parameter structural vector au-
toregressive (TVP-SVAR) with MCMC procedure by a Bayesian approach, and identify
both of government spending and tax cut shocks using the zero and sign restrictions
method proposed by Arias, Rubio-Ramirez and Waggoner (2018). And we compare
those values with time varying version identified by standard sign restriction along
the line of Mountford and Uhlig (2009). Our estimation reports that time-varying fis-
cal multipliers of output by government spending rule could be nearly double for one
year but decline to unity after eight years, and seem to have been very stable for long
terms such as sixty years. By contrast, those of tax cut rule are more fluctuate and
negative for long run except the 1990’s.
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1 Introduction
The effectiveness of fiscal policy has been the subject of a long-standing debate among
economists and policymakers. Even though governments around the world often imple-
ment fiscal stimulus packages in hope that they will counter the economic downturn,
in fact, there is still no clear-cut answer to how and why the fiscal policy can have an
impact on the economy. Theoretically, neoclassical and New Keynesian models can lead
to the exact opposite implications about the policy increasing public spending or cutting
taxes. While empirical investigation could be expected to shed light on the debate, almost
all existing identification schemes at least partly rely on the assumptions suggested by
the theoretical models, and the different estimation methods or identification strategies
lead to substantial disagreement on the sign and the size of fiscal multipliers. 1
Another problem of assessing the effect of fiscal policy is that even if we can choose
one specific empirical approach, results may vary as the sample period varies. The pos-
sibility of structural change or time variation of transmission mechanism of the fiscal
policy can be important problems for the government, since the massive fiscal stimulus
are always put in place when the severe economic downturn happens, which tends to
come with significant structural changes. Indeed, several empirical studies suggests the
shift of fiscal multipliers with business cycles (Tagkalakis (2008), Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2012), Bachmann and Sims (2012), Candelon and Lieb (2013) and Caggiano
et al. (2015)) and the volume of public debt level (Favero et al. (2011), Corsetti et al.
(2012) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013)).
In this paper, we uncover changes in the effects of government spending shocks in
the US over the period 1952-2018. To address the issues mentioned above, our meth-
ods have two distinct features. First, to identify both of government spending and tax
cut shocks in a parsimonious and a data-consistent way, we use the systematic com-
ponent identification scheme proposed by Caldara and Kamps (2017) and Arias et al.
(2018). According to Caldara and Kamps (2017), frequently used identification method,
which includes recursive ordering assumptions on the structural shocks, sign restric-
tion on the impulse response and Proxy SVAR approach, can be characterized by the
different type of the restrictions on the systematic component of fiscal policy represented
as the rules relating policy instruments (e.g. government spending, tax rate) to macroe-
conomic conditions. In these existing methods, the sign and the size of coefficients on
non-policy variables (e.g. output, inflation rate, interest rate) of such policy rule are im-
plicitly assigned by the elements outside the data, for example economic theory, timing
assumption, or estimation methods itself. In contrast, the systematic component iden-
tification approach explicitly uses information of directly estimated policy rule, so the
imposed identification assumption is based on the evidence consistent with the data. In
1For a comprehensive survey, see Chinn (2013).
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this paper, we impose the sign and zero restriction on the contemporaneous response of
government spending to the changes of other non-policy variables based on the estima-
tion results of fiscal spending and tax rules by Caldara and Kamps (2017). The method
allows us to be free of any a priori assumption about the response of non-policy vari-
ables to the fiscal spending shocks, to adopt an agnostic position concerning the still
controversial topics such as the existence and size of crowding effects of government ex-
penditure and to provide useful information to test various theoretical implications the
different models have suggested.
Second, we document the time-variation of fiscal spending multiplier using the tools
of Bayesian time-varying parameters VAR (TVP-VAR) model. As argued in Cogley and
Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005), the model has great flexibility in terms of capturing
non-linearities and time heterogeneity and outperforms simpler methods including sub-
sample or rolling-windows estimation by allowing us to estimate, not impose a priori, the
number and the timing of the breaks. Although TVP-VAR models have been already used
in a large number of papers focusing on monetary policy (Cogley and Sargent (2001),
Cogley and Sargent (2005), Primiceri (2005), Baumeister, and Benati (2013), Belongia
and Ireland (2016)), much less work has been done on the fiscal policy analysis. Kirchner,
Cimadomo, and Hauptmeier (2010) investigates changes in the impact of EURO area’s
government spending shocks using a recursive identification scheme. Pereira and Lopes
(2014) estimates the TVP-VAR model with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) type restriction
using the US data before the global financial crisis. To best of our knowledge, this is the
first paper to combine the systematic component approach with the TVP-VAR framework
and to document the time-varying fiscal spending multipliers in the US.
Using five endogenous variables, i.e., (1) government spending, (2) real GDP (3) tax
revenue (4) inflation (5) nominal interest rate, we estimate for the US economy between
1952:Q1-2018:Q1. The main findings are as follows. Time-varying fiscal multipliers of
output by government spending rule could be nearly double for one year but decline to
unity after eight years, and seem to have been very stable for sixty years. By contrast,
those of tax cut rule are negative except period of the 1990’s. We verify that this method
is quite useful to do this end by compared with identifications by only sign restrictions,
since the contemporaneous elasticity of output and inflation, whose signs and zero re-
striction this method can control, is thought to strongly affect both size and direction of
fiscal multipliers.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes about the
TVP-VARs as well as identifications of fiscal policy shocks. Estimated results including
time-varying impulse responses of the policy shocks and time-varying fiscal multipli-
ers are reported in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. The methods of the identification
with sign and zero restrictions and a Bayesian inference including algorithms for MCMC
simulation for TVP-VARs are described in four appendix sections.
3
2 Empirical Methodology
In this section, we describe empirical methodology measuring time variations of fis-
cal multipliers. In the first subsection, a TVP VAR model incorporated with stochas-
tic volatilities (SV) in its disturbance terms is introduced as our backbone model. The
distinguished advantage of the model is to be designed to make coefficients and the co-
variance matrix of innovations time-vary in terms of all aspects from the viewpoint of
‘agnostic’. The second subsection describes how to identify two fiscal policy shocks us-
ing the systematic component approach. The final two subsections deals with calculating
fiscal multipliers and data used for estimation. Again, the methods of the identification
with sign and zero restrictions and a Bayesian inference including algorithms for MCMC
simulation for TVP-VARs are described in four appendix sections.
2.1 Set up TVP-VAR-SV
Consider the p-th lag length structual vector autoregression (SVAR(p) ) model defined as
A0,tyt = A1,tyt−1 + · · ·+Ap,tyt−p +Σtεt, εt ∼ N(0, I), (1)
where yt is a k × 1 vector of observed variables, structural parameters Ai,t, i = 1, ..., p,
are k × k matrices of time varying coefficients, and a contemporaneous matrix A0,t is
invertible and decomposed into a orthogonal matrix Qt , i.e., QtQ′t = I , and a lower
triangular matrix Atr,t such that A0,t = QtAtr,t, where
Atr,t =

1 0 · · · 0
a21,t
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
ak1,t · · · akk−1,t 1
 .
The disturbance εt is a k × 1 vector of structural shocks and a time-varying covariance
matrix Σt is a diagonal matrix that contains the stochastic volatilities which reflect the
changes of the independent structural shocks σi,t such as
Σt =

σ1,t 0 · · · 0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 σk,t
 .
And the p-th lag length reduced VAR (p) model corresponding to above SVAR model is
given by
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yt = B1,tyt−1 + · · ·+Bp,tyt−p + ut, ut ∼ N(0, Ωt ), (2)
where Bi,t is a time varying reduced-form parameters given by Bi,t = A−10,tAi,t, and ut
is a one-period ahead forecasting error: ut = A−10,tΣtεt, because A0,tΩA
′
0,t = ΣtΣ
′
t. And
also we can rewrite the one-period ahead forecasting errors as ut = A−1tr,tQt Σtεt , using
A−10,t = A
−1
tr,tQ
′
t. Notice that Qt is a random matrix so that we can select its value to make
structural shocks identified to satisfy zero and sign restrictions, as explained in the next
subsection.
Letting βt be a stacked k2p× 1 vector of the elements in the rows of the k × k matrices
of the B1,t,· · · ,Bp,t, and at be the vector of non-zero and non-one elements of the lower
triangular matrix Atr,t . ht is the logarithm of the diagonal elements of time varying
volatilities matrix, ln σ2j,t. The dynamics of the time varying parameters of the reduced
form are following random walk process as below.
βt+1 = βt + uβ,t, (3)
at+1 = at + ua,t, (4)
ht+1 = ht + uh,t, (5)
where βt = (β11,t, ..., βkk,t) , at = (a21,t, ..., akk−1,t) and ht = (h1,t, ..., hk,t) with hj,t = lnσ2j,t
for j = 1, ..., k. And ub,t, ua,t, and uh,t, are assumed to be normally distributed with a zero
mean and diagonal covariance matrices, Σβ, Σa, and Σh . The structural shocks are also
assumed to independent with the time-varying parameters such as
εt
uβ,t
ua,t
uh,t
 ∼ N


0
0
0
0
 ,

1 0 0 0
0 Σ2β 0 0
0 0 Σ2a 0
0 0 0 Σ2h

 . (6)
2.2 Identification by Systematic Components
Fiscal Policy Rules
Systematic component approach to identify the structural shocks is first proposed by
Caldara and Kamps (2017) and Arias et al. (2018). They focus on the fact that the identi-
fication of policy shocks implies the specification of the systematic component of policy,
which describes how policy usually reacts to economic conditions.2 As pointed out in
Caldara and Kamps (2017), labeling a structural shock in the SVAR as the goverment
spending shock is equivalent to specifying the same equation as the government spend-
2This fact is pointed out by Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996), Leeper and Zha (2003), and Sims and Zha
(2006a).
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ing rule. Without loss of generality, we let the first shock be the government spending
shock. The first equation of (1)
a0,t,1yt =
p∑
`=1
a`,t,1yt−l + σ1,tε1t (7)
is the time-varying government spending rule, where ε1t denotes the first entry of εt, a`,t,1
denotes the first row of A`,t for 0 ≤ ` ≤ p, and a`,t,ij denotes the (i, j) entry of A`,t. From
equation (7), it is clear that restricting the systematic component of government spending
policy is equivalent to restricting a`,t,1 for 0 ≤ ` ≤ p.
Our TVP-VAR model consists of five endogenous variables: government spending, de-
fined as the sum of government consumption and investment (gt); gross domestic prod-
uct (yt); consumer price inflation (pit); the 3-month T-bill rate (rt); and federal tax revenue
(taxt). We take the natural logarithm and extract a quadratic trend for all the variables in
per capita terms except pit and rt. We estimate the model on quarterly data for the U.S.
from 1952 to 2018.
Our government spending rule can be written as
gt = ψy,t yt + ψr,t rt + ψpi,t pit + ψtax,t taxt︸ ︷︷ ︸
systematic component
+ εg,t︸︷︷︸
shock.
(8)
where ψy,t = −a−10,t,11a0,t,12, ψpi,t = −a−10,t,11a0,t,13, ψr,t = −a−10,t,11a0,t,14, and ψtax,t = −a−10,t,11a0,t,15.
Since our identification concentrates on the contemporaneous structural parameters, we
here abstract from lag variables. Based on the estimation results of Caldara and Kamps
(2017), we impose the zero and sign restrictions on these systematic components as
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Systematic Components Restrictions for Government Spending Rule
parameters ψy,t ψpi,t ψr,t ψtax,t
Zero and Sign Restrictions <0 <0 =0 =0
Notes: “=0” denotes zero restriction, and “<0” and “>0” stand for negative and positive restrictions,
respectively.
Since all the parameters in (8) have clear rolls for the movement of policy variable, we
can add some interpretations about the sign of them. For example, a negative elasticity of
inflation rate in the government spending rule may reflect the fact that nominal govern-
ment spending is not fully indexed to inflation in the U.S., so real government spending
falls in response to an increase in inflation. The important thing here, however, is that
we do NOT impose the restriction ψpi < 0 based on this theoretical interpretation. Rather,
we simply accept the fact that estimated coefficent on pit in the government spending
rule is negative, and draw on this empirical evidence to identify the spending shock. The
same thing can be said to the other restrictions.
6
In similar way, our tax cut rule can be written as
Taxt = ψ
t
y,t yt + ψ
t
r,t rt + ψ
t
pi,t pit + ψ
t
g,tGovt︸ ︷︷ ︸
systematic component
+ εtax,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
shock.
, (9)
where ψy,t = −a−10,t,51a0,t,12, ψpi,t = −a−10,t,15a0,t,13, ψr,t = −a−10,t,15a0,t,14, and ψg,t = −a−10,t,15a0,t,11.
Based on the estimation results of Caldara and Kamps (2017), we impose the sign re-
strictions on these systematic components as summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Systematic Components Restrictions for Tax Cut Rule
parameters ψy. ψr ψpi ψg
Sign Restrictions >0 >0 >0 <0
Notes: “<0” and “>0” stand for negative and positive restrictions, respectively.
It is worth noting that the main part of our restrictions are represented as sign and
zero restrictions directly on the structural parameters, unlike a large number of stud-
ies using set identification impose sign restrictions on the impulse response functions.
We do so using the Bayesian approach and the techniques developed in Arias, Rubio-
Ramirez, and Waggoner (2018).
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs)
Next, we consider the derivation of IRFs in a standard VAR with constant structural
parameters:A0, A+, following Arias, Rubio-Ramirez, and Waggoner (2018). Let Lh(A0, A+)
denote the IRF of the i-th variable to j-th structural shock at finite horizon h given by a
n× n matrix as below.
IRh(A0, A+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n×n
= (A−10 J
′F hJ)′
where A′+ = [A′1, · · · , A′p],
F︸︷︷︸
pn×pn
=

A1A
−1
0 In · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
Ap−1A−10 0 · · · In
ApA
−1
0 0 · · · 0
 and J︸︷︷︸pn×n =

In
0
...
0
 ,
where In is a n×n identity matrix. Next, we apply them to the IRFs in the TVP-VARs. The
IRFs: Lh(A0, A+), can be rewritten as
IRh(At,0, At,+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n×n
=
(
A−1t,0J
′
(
t+h∏
i=t
Fi
)
J
)T
,
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where A′t,+ = [A′t,1, · · · , A′t,p],
Ft︸︷︷︸
pn×pn
=

At,1A
−1
t,0 In · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
At,p−1A−1t,0 0 · · · In
At,pA
−1
t,0 0 · · · 0
 .
Notice that the product of time-varying structural parameters: At,kA−1t,0 is equivalent to
time-varying reduced-form parameters Bt,k for 1 ≤ k ≤ p.
Using the orthogonal matrix Qt, the above IRF, IRh(A0, A+)= IRh(AtrQ,A+) , is trans-
formed to IRh(Atr, A+Q′)Q, for horizons, 0 ≤ h ≤ ∞. It indicates that the sets of struc-
tural parameters (A0, A+) and (Atr, A+Q′) are observationally equivalent so that we can
replace A0 with Atr in the IRF. Accordingly, instead of A0, the lower triangular matrix
Atr derived from Cholesky decomposition is used together with the matrix Q to be conve-
nient to calculate. Let f(A0, A+) be combination of contemporaneous matrix A0 and the
stacked IRF at horizon zero and long term: L, given by a 3n× n matrix as below.
f(A0, A+) =
 A0IR0(A0, A+)
IRL(A0, A+)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
3n×n
=
 AtrQIR0(Atr, A+Q′)Q
IRL(Atr, A+Q
′)Q

︸ ︷︷ ︸
3n×n
. (10)
Using the function f(A0, A+), we can identify the SVARs imposed from the zero and sign
restrictions of the IRFs to the two fiscal policy shocks. From Tables 1 and 2, we impose
the matrix A0, while the restrictions of the IRFs are following Tables 3 and 4. Those tables
show the zero and sign restrictions of government spending and tax cut rules for both of
short and long terms, respectively. In the case of government spending rule, the positive
shock immediately increases government spending and gradually converge to the zero
for long run as Table 3. After disappearing of effect of this shock, variation of output also
converges to the zero for long run. Meanwhile, the tax cut shock immediately decrease
tax revenue and gradually converge to the zero for long run as Table 4. Similarly, the
effect of output also disappears for long run.
Table 3: Sign and Zero Restrictions for IRF to Government Spending Shock
Structural Endogenous Variables
Shocks Gov. Output pi R Tax
Gov. Spend. Short Run >0 ? ? ? ?
Shock Long Run =0 =0 ? ? ?
Notes: “=0” denotes zero restriction, and “<0” and “>0” stand for negative and positive restrictions, respec-
tively. “?” denotes no restriction.
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Table 4: Sign and Zero Restrictions for IRF to Tax Cut Shock
Structural Shocks Gov. Tax Output pi R
Tax Cut Short Run (0 Q) ? <0 ? ? ?
Shock Long Run (20 Q) ? =0 =0 ? ?
Notes: “=0” denotes zero restriction, and “<0” and “>0” stand for negative and positive restrictions, respec-
tively. “?” denotes no restriction.
2.3 Alternative Identification
We also introduce an alternative model in order to compare and evaluate the magnitude
and direction of time varying fiscal multipliers. To do so, we adopt one of prevalent
models which identify a fiscal policy shock by only sign restriction proposed by Mountford
and Uhlig (2009). In this model, government spending shock is assumed to be orthogonal
to tax, monetary policy and business cycle shocks. In addition, our compared model
incorporate zeros restriction for long run to these four temporary shocks, since they are
associated with demand shocks which indicates that they have effect on endogenous
variables only in short run along the lines of Blanchard and Quah (1985). The zero and
sign restriction are represented in Table 5.
Table 5: Zero and Sign Restrictions of Alternative Model
Shocks Gov. Output pi r tax
Gov Spend. Short Run >0 ? ? ? ?
Shock Long Run =0 ? ? ? ?
Tax Short Run ? ? ? ? >0
Shock Long Run ? ? ? ? =0
Business Cycles Short Run ? >0 ? ? ?
Shock Long Run ? =0 ? ? ?
Monetary Policy Short Run ? <0 <0 >0 ?
Shock Long Run ? =0 =0 =0 ?
Notes: “=0” denotes zero restriction, and “<0” and “>0” stand for negative and positive restrictions, respec-
tively. “?” denotes no restriction.
2.4 Measuring Fiscal Multipliers
In this study, we calculate an impact fiscal multiplier and a present value fiscal multi-
plier following Mountford and Uhlig (2009). The impact fiscal multiplier at horizon i of
structural shock s on endogenous variables y is defined as IFM = 4yt+i/4gt , and is
calculated from
9
e′yLi(A0, A+)qs
e′gL0(A0, A+)qs
1
(GOV/GDP )
,
where gt is the government spendings at period t, and (GOV/GDP ) denotes the average
share of the government expenditure in GDP over the sample period. In the similar
way, the present value fiscal multiplier at horizon i of structural shock s on endogenous
variables y is given by CFM =
∑H
i=0 β
i4yt+i/
∑H
i=0 β
i4gt+i, and is calculated from∑H
i=0 β
ie′y Li(A0, A+) qs∑H
i=0 β
ie′g Li(A0, A+) qs
1
(GOV/GDP )
,
where H is the number of horizon to measure the impact of the policy shock for a spec-
ified interval and β is a discount factor. In our simulation, we calculate four cases
characterized from different horizons, i.e., H = 4, 8, 12, 20.
2.5 Data
We use the quarterly data from the U.S. for the period between 1952:Q1 and 2018:Q1.
Following Caldra and Kamps (2017), we select the observed variables composed from
five endogenous variables: government spending, defined as the sum of government
consumption and investment (gt); gross domestic product (yt); consumer price inflation
(pit); the 3-month T-bill rate (rt); and federal tax revenue (taxt). We take the natural
logarithm and extract a quadratic trend for all the variables in per capita terms except pit
and rt. Data are shown as Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Data
Notes: Our TVP-VAR model adopts seven endogenous variables: government spending, defined
as the sum of government consumption and investment (gt); gross domestic product (yt); private
consumption (ct); private non-residential investment (invt); consumer price inflation (pit); the 3-
month T-bill rate (intt); and federal tax revenue (taxt). We take the natural logarithm and extract
a quadratic trend for all the variables in per capita terms except pit and rt. We estimate the model
on quarterly data for the U.S. from 1952:Q1 to 2018:Q1.
3 Evidence on Time-Varying Fiscal Multiplier
3.1 MCMC Simulations
As described in the previous section, we adopt the Bayesian estimation with MCMC simu-
lation to obtain the posterior estimates satisfied both of zero and sign restrictions showed
in Table 1, based on the algorithm 4 proposed by Arias et al. (2018). We run 240,000
MCMC simulations which consists of 15,000 iterations times 16 chains, discarding the
first 5000 iterations of each chain to converge to the ergodic distribution, and sampling
only draws satisfying the zero and sign restrictions out of the next 10,000 iterations of
each chain. To calculate the effects of the IRF for the long run, we set L = 80 quarter (20
years) ahead in eq.(10).
Figure 2 shows the transition of the acceptance rates satisfying the zero and sign
restrictions out of the 160,000 samples in each period. The acceptance rates of the
identification by the government spending rule changes within the range of 15 % to over
20 % for the sample period, while those of identification by the tax cut rule show the
range of around 5 %. These acceptance rates mean that approximately 30 thousands
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samples are used for posterior estimation of SVAR based on the government spending
rule, and 8 thousands samples are used in the case of the tax cut rule, respectively.
And we use these samples to calculate time-varying fiscal multipliers as shown in the
following subsection.
Figure 2: Accepted Rates of Zero and Sign Restrictions
3.2 Time Variations of Systematic Components
Panel (a) of Figure 3 show the time series transition of poserior means of parameters of
systematic components based on method by the government spending rule, while Panel
(b) draws those of coefficients of a corresponding column out of contemporaneous matrix
A0 derived from identification by the tax cut rule.
According to the paper by Caldara and Kamps (2017), the contemporaneous elasticity
of government spending to output: ψy, and to inflation rate: ψpi, are reported to be around
-0.13 and -0.75, respectively. On the other hand, our estimations of time varying those
elasticities show -1.0 and -3 through -4, respectively, which mean they are much higher
absolute values than those fixed values reported by Caldara and Kamps (2017) over all
of the sample period. Meanwhile, the posterior means of ψy are positive and around 1.5
over all sample period and those of ψpi are around 2.5 for the tax cut rule, as Panel (b).
Differences of sizes and signs of ψy andψpi between two models are thought to be influence
fiscal multipliers according to Caldara and Kamps (2017). In the following subsection,
we examine this thing using time-varying parameter SVAR.
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Figure 3: Contemporaneous Elasticities of Fiscal Policy Rules
(a) Government Spending Rule
gt = ψy,t yt + ψr,t rt + ψpi,t pit + ψtax,t taxt︸ ︷︷ ︸
systematic component
+ εgt︸︷︷︸
shock.
,
parameters ψy. ψr ψpi ψtax
Sign and Zero Restrictions <0 =0 <0 =0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
y
r
(b) Tax Cut Rule
Taxt = ψ
t
y,t yt + ψ
t
r,t rt + ψ
t
pi,t pit + ψ
t
g,tGovt︸ ︷︷ ︸
systematic component
+ εtax,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
shock.
,
parameters ψy. ψr ψpi ψg
Sign Restrictions >0 >0 >0 <0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
y
g
r
Notes: The blue shade areas stand for the recessions reported by NBER.
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3.3 Time Variations of Impulse Responses
Government Spending Shock
We draw two-dimension version of IRFs as Figure 4. The upper six graphs of Panel (a) in
the figure depict the IRFs of real GDP to the government spending shock with respect to
six different periods; i.e., 1960:Q1, 1970:Q1, 1990:Q1, 2000:Q1, 2010:Q1, while lower
six graphs show time varying those of six different horizons; i.e., 1 Q ahead, 4Q ahead,
8Q ahead, 12Q ahead, 16Q ahead, 20 Q ahead for sample periods. The blue solid lines
represent the posterior means of the IRF fixed by periods, while light blue shaded areas
represent 68\% intervals. Similarly, the red solid lines and red shaded area are the
posterior means and 68 % band of the IRF fixed by horizons, respectively. Panels (b),
(c) and (d) depict the same kinds of graphs for tax revenue, interest rate, and inflation,
respectively.
As shown in Panel (a), we can verify that the positive spending shock makes responses
of real GDP for overall of horizon positive and the zero restriction of output for long run
make itself converge to zero for all sample period. Meanwhile, we can see that familiar
hump shape responses of the three variables, although there are neither sign nor zero
restrictions for the three variables except government expenditure for contemporaneous
response and for long run. These shapes are due to restriction by the systematic compo-
nent of fiscal policy rules. As Panel (b), posterior means of contemporaneous response of
tax revenue are also positive for all sample period although 68% bands hit the line of 0
% in around 15Q. And they seem to gradually converge to zero in spite of not imposing
zero restrictions.
In the cases of interest rate and inflation, results of the IRFs are also positive to the
government expenditure, and both seem to converge gradually to steady state. For over
long sample period from 1952Q1 to 2018Q1, all of the IRFs have been very stable to the
government spending shock.
Tax Cut Shock
In the similar way, Figure 5 shows the IRFs of the four variables to the tax cut shock.
The tax cut shock make responses of interest rate and inflation positive but those of gov-
ernment spending negative. On the other hand, the response of output are ambiguous,
since 68 % band of the response cover both of positive and negative areas. However, we
observe that posterior means of these responses go to negative for long run from 1960’s
to 1980’s, while those change to be positive for middle terms in 1990’s and 2000’s.
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Figure 4: Time Varying Impulse Response Functions to Government Spending Shock
(a) Response of real GDP (b) Response of Tax Revenue
(c) Response of Interest Rate (d) Response of Inflation
Notes: The blue solid lines represent the posterior means of the IRF fixed by periods, while light
blue shaded areas represent 68% intervals. Similarly, the red solid lines and red shaded area are
the posterior means and 68% band of the IRF fixed by horizons, respectively.
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Figure 5: Time Varying Impulse Response Functions to Tax Cut Shock
(a) Response of real GDP (b) Response of Gov. Spending
(c) Response of Interest Rate (d) Response of Inflation
Notes: The blue solid lines represent the posterior means of the IRF fixed by periods, while light
blue shaded areas represent 68% intervals. Similarly, the red solid lines and red shaded area are
the posterior means and 68% band of the IRF fixed by horizons, respectively.
3.4 Time Variations of Fiscal Multipliers
Figures 6 through 8 depict the cumulative fiscal multipliers of real GDP, government
spending and tax revenue, respectively. The upper, middle and lower graphs of each
figure represent time-varying fiscal multipliers for period of one, five and eight years
after both of the fiscal policy shocks hits the economy, respectively. The red line is the
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posterior means of time-varying fiscal multipliers identified by the government spending
shock and the blue line is those by tax cut shock. The dotted lines of both colors are the
average of time varying fiscal multiplier for all of the periods. Our paper pays attention
for examining the extent to which real GDP is influenced by an increase of government
expenditure by one percent. Therefore, we quantify the present discounted value of
cumulative fiscal multipliers for both identifications of the policy shocks by Caldara and
Kamps (2017).
As Figure 6, the time-varying fiscal multipliers of real GDP by government spending
rule (the red solid line) could be nearly double for one year but decline to unity after eight
years, and seem to have been very stable for sixty years. On the other hand, those of tax
cut rule (the blue solid line) are positive but tiny for one year, and change to negative for
more than five years except period of the 1990’s.
As Figure 7, the tax cut shock is likely to reduce the same size of government spending
before 1990 for all three kinds of horizons, because the three cumulative multipliers (the
blue solid line) show minus one. After the 1990’s, the cumulative multipliers for five
and eight years reach at two or over. It also indicates that a tax raise shock requires an
increment of government spending more than the increment of tax. And as Figure 8, the
government spending shock (the red solid line) increase the same size of increase of tax
revenue for all three kinds of horizons for all over sample period. It means that response
of tax revenue to the government spending shock have been stable.
Figure 6: Cumulative Fiscal Multipliers of Real GDP
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Figure 7: Cumulative Fiscal Multipliers of Government Spending
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Figure 8: Cumulative Fiscal Multipliers of Tax Revenue
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3.5 Robustness Check
Here, as robustness check, we expand our models from five endogenous variables to
seven variables by adding private consumption and investment. Figure 9 show the pos-
terior means of coefficents of systematic components based on fiscal policy rules, eq.(8)
and eq.(9). Similar to the case of five variables model, the sign and zero restrictions of
government spending rule and tax cut rule follow Table 1 through Table 4. By introduc-
ing private consumption and investment, coefficients of ψy of both rules become more
than twice of five variables version, since the coefficients of private consumption and
investment, ψc and ψi, have opposite signs against ψy . In other words, sizes of ψc and ψi
work to balance out both of government spending and tax against impacts to increment
of GDP. It suggests that we should also consider sign restrictions for ψc and ψi for both
fiscal policy rules. However, increasing number of sign restrictions brings to decreasing
in acceptance rate of Bayesian estimation as shown in Table 1, and it requires much
more sampling number of MCMC procedure.
Figure 9: Contemporaneous Elasticities of Fiscal Policy Rules Using Seven Variables
(a) Government Spending Rule (b) Tax Cut Rule
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Notes: Coefficients are based on fiscal policy rules, eq.(8) and eq.(9). The sign and zero restrictions of
government spending rule and tax cut rule are following Table 1 through Table 4.
And Figure 10 shows cumulative multipliers of four variables, i.e., real GDP, tax
revenue, private consumption and private investment, by government spending shocks
identified by systematic component of government spending rule and by just sign re-
striction in Mountford and Uhlig (2009)’s style as described in Section 2.3. As Panel (a),
the seven-variable-version of time-varying fiscal multipliers of real GDP by systematic
component (the red solid and dashed lines) are very similar to the five-variable’s one,
since the averages for one year and for five years are around two and one, respectively.
But, the size of multipliers of tax revenue are less than one, which means smaller than
five-variable version as Panel (b). By contrast, multipliers by just sign restriction (the
blue solid and dashed lines) are as small as 0.5 or less, even though they are positive.
The size of multipliers of consumption and investment is new information, as shown in
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Panels (c) and (d). We figure out that the response of private consumption to government
spending is positive for short period but negative for long run. Meanwhile, the responses
of private investment are negative for both of short and long run.
3.6 Discussion
Finally, we consider why these two fiscal policies have different effect on real GDP as
Figure 6. Our previous estimations, which adopted a similar TVP-VAR with seven vari-
ables including private consumption and investment as Figure 9, found that there are a
positive response of the consumption and a negative response of the investment to the
positive government spending shock. In particular, these relationships become much
stronger in the 1990’s than other periods. Accordingly, we suggest that there are causal
relations among those variables as below.
G ↑⇒ C ↑ + I ↓⇒ Y ↑⇒ T ↑= G ↑
A positive government spending shock generates positive feedback cycle of real GDP
except private investment. These relations have recently been supported by a heteroge-
neous agent New Keynesian (HANK) approach (Kaplan et al. 2018). As Figure 6, these
relations lies within all over sample period.
On the other hand, until the 1980’s, there are causal relations between those vari-
ables and a tax cut shock as below.
T ↓⇒ I ↑⇒ G ↓= C ↓⇒ Y + 0
The impact of real GDP to tax cut had had limited magnitude for the period. It indicates
that tax reduction policy did not show a significant effect on real economic activities
under the Regan Administration, in spite of emerging budget deficit. However, after
entering to the 1990’s we can see that tax effect on private consumption and investment
have got stronger written as
T ↓⇒ I ↑↑⇒ G ↓= C ↓↓⇒ Y ↑
As we have known, in the actual US economy between 1992 and 2000 the Clinton Ad-
ministration had taken the fiscal expansion policy including tax increase in order to
resolve fiscal deficit produced in the previous presidential period. That is, opposite tax
policy had been taken and, as result, it induces to both of massive decline of private
investment and rise of private consumption because of increase of government spending
generated from increment of tax revenue.
After the middle term of the 2000’s, the administration has gone back to the Republi-
can Party, and the effect of tax reduction also came back to the previous level. However,
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Figure 10: Cumulative Fiscal Multipliers using Seven Variables
(a) real GDP (b) Tax Revenue
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(c) Private Consumption (d) Private Investment
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the fiscal multipliers of government spending shown stable until 2000 seem to have
gradually declined since 2000.
From our estimations, we are wondering whether there is asymmetric effects between
an increase and a decrease of tax. By contrast, there are symmetric effects between
positive and negative government spending policies. In other words, a tax reduction
policy brings no significant impact of real GDP with increase of investment and decrease
of consumption, whereas a tax raise policy obviously declines real GDP by including
massive decline of private investment despite expansion of government spending.
4 Conclusion
This study estimates time varying fiscal multipliers from the aspect of a fiscal policy rule
derived from the systematic component along the line of “Agnostic Identication Procedure”
proposed by Caldara and Kamps (2017) for the US economy between 1952:Q1-2018:Q1.
To do so, we combine time-varying paramter vector autoregressive (TVP-VAR) with MCMC
procedure by a Bayesian approach, and indentification of a fiscal policy shock using both
of the zero and sign restrictions method proposed by Arias, Rubio-Ramirez and Waggoner
(2018). (So we call our model a TVP-SVAR.)
And we compare those values with time varying version identified by standard sign
restriction along the line of Mountford and Uhlig (2009). Our estimation reports that
time-varying fiscal multipliers of output by government spending rule could be nearly
double for one year but decline to unity after eight years, and seem to have been very
stable for long terms such as sixty years. By contrast, those of tax cut rule are more
fluctuate and negative for more than five years except period of the 1990’s.
According to empirical results, we are wondering whether there is asymmetric effects
between an increase and a decrease of tax, while we suppose that there are symmetric
effects between positive and negative government spending policies. In other words, a
tax reduction policy brings no significant impact of real GDP with increase of investment
and decrease of consumption. By contrast, a tax raise policy obviously declines real
GDP including massive decline of private investment despite of expansion of government
spending.
We verify that this method is quite useful to do this end by compared with iden-
tifications by only sign restrictions, since the contemporaneous elasticity of output and
inflation, whose signs and zero restriction this method can control, is thought to strongly
affect both size and direction of fiscal multipliers.
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A Appendix
A.1 Zero and Sign Restrictions
Zero restrictions
We consider how to impose the IRFs from the zero restrictions, using the manner by
Arias, Rubio-Ramirez, and Waggoner (2018). Let Zj denote a matrix in which the number
of column is equal to the number of rows in f(A0, A+) and j is the j-th structural shock
imposing the zero restrictions. Using the orthogonal matrix Qt, the product of the zero
restrictions matrices and the IRF is transformed as below.
Zj f(A0Q, A+Q) ej = Zj f(A0, A+)Qej = Zj f(A0, A+) qj ,
where qj = Qej. And then, the zero restrictions will hold if and only if
Zjf(A0, A+)qj = 0, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
where n is number of endogenous variables. From Table 1 and Table 3, we set up the
matrix of zero restrictions of government spending shock, Z1, as
Z1︸︷︷︸
Rz×3n
=

y g pi R t | y g pi R t | y g pi R t
0 0 0 1 0 | 0 0 0 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 | 0 0 0 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 0 | 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 0 | 0 1 0 0 0

where elements corresponding to the endogenous variables imposed zero restrictions are
set one, otherwise zero. The first n columns of the zero restriction matrix correspond
to contemporaneous matrix A0 , the second n columns correspond to the short run
restriction; LR0(A0, A+), while the latter n columns of the matrix do to the long run
restrictions: LRL(A0, A+). And the number of rows, RZ , equals the number of the zero
restrictions of the corresponding i-th shock shown in Tables 1 and 3. Notice that the the
number of the zero restrictions is equal to the number of endogenous variables: n, less
the ordinal number i of the i-th structual shock.
Sign restrictions
In the similar way to the above zero restrictions, sign restrictions can be implemented
using a matrix expression. Let Sj be a matrix in which the number of column is equal
to the number of rows in f(A0, A+) and j is the j-th structural shock imposed the sign
restrictions. Using the orthogonal matrix Qt, the product of the sign restrictions matrices
and the IRF is transformed as below.
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Sj f(A0Q,A+Q) ej = Sjf(A0, A+)Qej = Sjf(A0, A+)qj ,
And then, the sign restrictions will hold if and only if
Sj f(A0, A+) qj > 0, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
From Table 1 and Table 3, we set up the matrix of sign restrictions of government spend-
ing shock, S1, as
S1︸︷︷︸
RS×3n
=

y g pi R t | y g pi R t | y g pi R t
1 0 0 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 | 0 1 0 0 0 | 0 0 0 0 0
 ,
where elements corresponding to the endogenous variables imposed the sign restrictions
are set one, otherwise zeros. The first n columns of the sign restriction matrix correspond
to contemporaneous matrix A0 , the second n columns correspond to the short run
restriction; LR0(A0, A+), while the latter n columns of the matrix do to the long run
restrictions: LRL(A0, A+). And the number of rows, RS, indicates the number of the sign
restrictions of the corresponding i-th shock shown in Tables 1 and 3.
QR decomposition
Let X = QR be the QR decomposition of a n × n matrix X. The n × n random matrix Q
has the uniform distribution, i.e., QQ′ = I. and the n× n matrix R is a upper triangular
matrix.
Let the matrix X be defined as
Xj(A0, A+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n×n
=
[
Zjf(A0, A+)
Q′j−1
]T
,
and the orthogonal matrix Qj given from the QR decomposition of a n×n matrix Xj(A0, A+)
satisfies the zero restrictions, or Xj(A0, A+)qj = 0 where qj = Qjej. By stacking them such
as Q = [q1, · · · , qn], we obtain the rotation matrix Q to identify the SVAR model.
Algorithm for both restrictions
Finally, we show algorithm for both restrictions using the above QR decomposition. The
sets of structural parameters are identified based on Algorithm 4 by Arias et al. (2014)
consisting of the following four steps.
1. Draw the sets of reduced-form parameters (B,Ω).
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2. Using the QR decomposition mentioned above, draw an orthogonal matrix Q satis-
fies the zero restrictions, or Zjf(A0, A+)qj = 0, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n .
3. Keep the draw if the sign restrictions are satisfied, or Sj f(A0, A+) qj > 0, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
otherwise discard the draw.
4. Return to step 1 until the required number of draws from the posterior distribution
conditional on the sign and zero restrictions has been obtained.
Here, we remark as follows. In Step 2 and Step 3, the structural parameters A0 are
observationally equivalent to the lower triangular matrix Atr. So instead of A0, we use Atr
derived from the inverse of Cholesky decomposition of Ω. And A+ is derived from BAtr.
A.2 Bayesian Estimation Methodology
State space model of TVP VARs
The TVP VARs are represented as state space models consisted of observation equations
and state equations. In our model, the observation equation is Eq. (2) with observable
variables yt, and the state equations are Eq. (3), Eq.(4), and Eq.(5) with time-varying
parameters, , regarded as state variables. And all parameters of the models are just
three such as σβ, σa and σh which determine covariances in Eq.(6).
Bayesian inference and MCMC Algorithm
Most of empirical studies dealing with TVP VARs have recently employed Bayesian infer-
ence via MCMC algorithm. Our study also follows them. There are four reasons to adopt
the Bayesian estimation via the MCMC. First, its counterpart method: maximum likeli-
hood estimation (MLE) method, is intractable to estimate because the state space model
includes the nonlinear state equation (5) involved stochastic volatilities. Second, under
the situation such as the uncertainty of parameters, the MCMC method is affordable to
estimate simultaneously both of state variables and parameters. Third, the functions of
both parameters and states variables such as the impulse response functions are also
able to be sampled as the posterior distributions of the functions. Forth, all sampled
parameters and state variables do not satisfied zero and sign restrictions. The impulse
response functions just satisfied both restrictions are sampled as the products of the
identified structural VAR.
In the state space model and the impulse response function involved the SVARs,
draws generated iteratively from the following conditional posterior distributions of state
variables and parameters must tend to convergence to the posterior joint distributions
based on the property of Gibbs sampler. The MCMC algorithm estimating our model
consists of the following nine steps.
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1. Initialize parameters: Σβ, Σa, Σh, and state variables: at, βt, ht.
2. Generate the state variables βt given at, ht, Σβ, yt, from the conditional posterior
distribution: f(βt|at, ht,Σβ,yt).
3. Generate the parametersΣβ given βt, from the conditional posterior distribution:
f(Σβ|βt).
4. Generate the state variables at given βt, ht, Σa, yt, from the conditional posterior
distribution: f(at|βt, ht,Σa,yt).
5. Generate the parametersΣa given at, from the conditional posterior distribution:
f(Σα|αt).
6. Generate the state variables ht given βt, at, Σh, yt, from the conditional posterior
distribution: f(ht|at, βt,Σβ,yt).
7. Generate the parameters Σh, given ht, from the conditional posterior distribution:
f(Σh|ht).
8. Generate the IRFs: f(A0, A+), based on the structural parameters: A0, A+, identified
with zero and sign restrictions, given at, βt, ht, yt.
9. Return to step 2 until the required number of draws from the posterior distribution
Here, we remark some points of the above MCMC simulation. In Step 8, the identification
of SVARs and generation of IRFs are implemented from the way described of Section 2.2.
In Steps 2 and 4, the simulation smoother of de Jong and Shephard (1995) is used for
drawing βt and at . In Step 7, a nonlinear filtering method based on block-sampling
method is used for sampling stochastic volatility ht, following Shephard and Pitt (1997),
Watanabe and Omori (2004) and Nakajima et a. (2011). These parts explaining the
MCMC procedure generating parameters in reduced-form TVP-VARs are described in
Appendix A1in more detail.
The priors of the parameters are specified as:(Σβ)2i ∼ IG(20, 10−4), (Σa)2i ∼ IG(20, 10−4),
and (Σh)2i ∼ IG(20, 10−4), where subscript i denotes the i-th diagonal elements of the
covariance matrices and IG an inverse-Gamma distribution. The initial state variables
are set as β0 ∼ N(0, 10I), a0 ∼ N(0, 10I), and h0 ∼ N(0, 10I).
A.3 MCMC procedure for TVP-VARs
In Section 2.3, we describe the nine steps of the MCMC algorithm estimating our model.
Here, we focus on the steps generating parameters in reduced-form TVP-VARs. This
section is described based on Appendix of Nakajima (2011) and Nakajima et al. (2011).
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A.3.1 Generate the state variables βt given at, ht, Σβ, Yt, from the conditional
posterior distribution: f(βt|at, ht,Σβ, Yt).
To generate βt from the conditional posterior distribution: f(βt|at, ht,Σβ, Yt), we introduce
the simulation smoother by de Jong and Shephard (1995) and Durbin and Koopman
(2002) using the state space model with respect to βt given by
yt = Xtβt +A
−1
t Σtεt, t = s+ 1, · · · , n, (11)
βt+1 = βt + uβ, t = s+ 1, · · · , n− 1,
where βs is set as µβ0, and uβs ∼ N(0,Σβ0).
A.3.2 Generate the state variables at given βt, ht, Σa, Yt , from the conditional
posterior distribution: f(at|βt, ht,Σa, Yt).
To generate at from the conditional posterior distribution: f(at|βt, ht,Σa, Yt), the simula-
tion smoother is also adopted from the following state space model,
yˆt = Xˆtat + Σtεt, t = s+ 1, · · · , n,
at+1 = at + uat, t = s, · · · , n− 1,
where as = µa0, uas ∼ N(0,Σa0), yˆt = yt −Xtβt, and
Xˆt =

0 · · · 0
−yˆ1t 0 0 · · ·
...
0 −yˆ1t −yˆ2t 0 · · ·
0 0 0 −yˆ1t · · ·
...
. . . 0 · · · 0
0 · · · 0 −yˆ1t · · · −yˆk−1t

,
for t = s+ 1, · · · , n.
A.3.3 Generate the state variables ht given βt, at, Σh, Yt, from the conditional
posterior distribution: f(ht|at, βt,Σβ, Yt).
To generate the stochastic volatility ht from the conditional posterior distribution: f(ht|at, βt,Σβ, Yt),
we conduct the inference for hjtnt=s+1 separately for j, because it is assumed that Σh and
Σh0 are diagonal matrices. Let y∗it denote the i-th element of Atyt. Then, we can write:
y∗it = exp(hit/2)εit, t = s+ 1, · · · , n,
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hi,t+1 = hit + ηit, t = s, · · · , n− 1,
(
εit
ηit
)
∼ N
(
0,
(
1 0
0 ν2i
))
,
where ηis ∼ N(0, ν2i0), and ν2i are the i-th diagonal elements of Σh and Σh0, respectively,
and ηit is the i-th element of uht. We sample ht = (hi,s+1, · · · , hin) using the multi-move
sampler developed by Shephard and Pitt (1997) and Watanabe and Omori (2004), the
algorithm of which is described in the following subsection.
A.3.4 Generate the parameters Σα , Σβ, andΣh.
To generate the parameter Σa given at, we draw the sample from the conditional posterior
distribution: Σ|at ∼ IW (νˆ, Ωˆ−1), where IW denotes the inverse-Wishart distribution, and
νˆ = ν0+n−1, Ωˆ = Ω0+
∑n−1
t=1 (at+1−at)(at+1−at)′ in which the prior is set as Σ ∼ IW (ν0,Ω−10 ).
Sampling the diagonal elememts of Σβ, Σh is also the same way to sample Σa.
A.4 Multi-Move Sampler of Stochastic Volatilities
This section is described based on Appendix of Nakajima (2011) and Nakajima et al.
(2011). The algoritm of the multi-move sampler proposed by Shephard and Pitt (1997),
Watanabe and Omori (2004) is adopted to generate draws of stochastic volatilities in the
TVP-VARs from the conditional posterior distributions explainded in Appendix A2. We
show the stochastic volatilities model again.
y∗t = exp(ht/2)εt, t = s+ 1, · · · , n,
ht+1 = φht + ηt, t = s, · · · , n− 1,
(
εt
ηt
)
∼ N
(
0,
(
1 0
0 σ2η
))
,
where y∗t denote the i-th element of Atyt shown in Eq.(11). For drawing a typical block
such as(hr, · · · , hr+d), we consider the draw of
(ηr−1, · · · , ηr+d−1) ∼ pi(ηr−1, · · · , ηr+d−1|ω)
∝
∏ 1
eht/2
exp
(
y∗2t
2eht
)
×
∏
f(ηt)× f(hr+d) (12)
where
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f(ηt) =
 exp
{
− (1−φ2)η20
2σ2η
}
exp
(
− η2t
2σ2η
) (if t = 0),
(if t ≥ 1),
f(hr+d) =
 exp
{
− (hr+d+1−φhr+d)2
2σ2η
}
1
(if r + d < n),
(if r + d = n),
and ω = (hr−1, hr+d+1, β, γ, φ, ). The posterior draw of (hr, · · · , hr+d) can be obtained by
running the state equation with the draw of (ηr−1, · · · , ηr+d−1) given hr−1.
We sample (ηr−1, · · · , ηr+d−1) from the density (12) using the acceptance-rejection MH
algorithm (Tierney, 1994; Chib and Greenberg, 1995) with the following proposal distri-
bution constructed from the second-order Taylor expansion of
g(ht) ≡ −ht
2
− y
∗2
t
2eht
,
around a certain point hˆt which is given by
g(ht) + g(ht) + g′(hˆt)(ht − hˆt) + 1
2
g′′(hˆt)(ht − hˆt)2
∝ 1
2
g′′(hˆt)
{
ht −
(
hˆt − g
′(hˆt)
g′′(hˆt)
)}2
,
Here, the first and second derivatives are obtained such that
g′(hˆt) = −1
2
+
y∗2t
2eht
, g′′(hˆt) = − y
∗2
t
2eht
,
And the proposal density of pi(ηr−1, · · · , ηr+d−1|ω) is given by
q(ηr−1, · · · , ηr+d−1|ω) ∝
∏
exp
{
−(h
∗
t − ht)2
2σ∗2t
}
×
∏
f(ηt),
where
σ∗2t = −
1
g′′(hˆt)
, h∗t = ht + σ
∗2
t g
′(hˆt), (13)
for t = r, · · · , r + d − 1, and t = r + d in the case that r + d = n. Meanwhile, in the case
thatr + d ≤ n,
σ∗2r+d =
1
−g′′(hˆt+d) + φ2/σ2η
(14)
h∗r+d = σ
∗2
r+d
{
g′(hr+d)− g′′(hr+d)hr+d + hr+d/σ2η
}
, (15)
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for t = r + d. The proposal density of the AR-MH algorithm is derived from the following
state space model,
h∗t = ht + ςt, t = s+ 1, · · · , n,
h,t+1 = ht + ηt, t = s, · · · , n− 1, (16)
(
ςt
ηt
)
∼ N
(
0,
(
σ∗2t 0
0 σ2η
))
,
with ηr−1 ∼ N(0, σ2η) when r ≥ 2 and ηs ∼ N(0, σ2η/(1 − φ2)). Given ω, we draw candidate
point of (ηr−1, · · · , ηr+d−1) for AR-MH algorithm by running the simulation smoother over
the state-space representation (16).
For realizing efficient drawings, we need to calculate the mode of the above posterior
density for (hˆr, · · · , hˆr+d). Numerically, we obtain the mode by iterating the following steps
several times,
1. Initialize (hˆr, · · · , hˆr+d).
2. Compute (h∗r , · · · , h∗r+d), and (σ∗r , · · · , σ∗r+d) by eq.(13) through eq.(15).
3. Run the simulation smoother for state space model eq.(16) with (h∗r , · · · , h∗r+d), and
(σ∗r , · · · , σ∗r+d) as obervable variables. And Generate estimations h∗t = E(ht|ω) for
t = r, · · · , r + d.
4. Replace (hˆr, · · · , hˆr+d) with (h∗r , · · · , h∗r+d).
5. Return to Step 2.
To implement a block sampling for ht, they are devided into K+1 blocks, say, (hk(i−1), · · · , hk(i))
for i = 1, · · · ,K + 1. Shephard and Pitt (1997) suggested to adopt stochastic knots for de-
termining the positions of blocks: i, the rule of which is given by
k(i) = int
[
n(j + Ui)
K + 2
]
,
for i = 1, · · · ,K, where int is a function rounding to an integer value from the insight, and
Ui is the random sample from the uniform distribution U [0, 1].
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